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Abstract 
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sibility to Protect (R2P) at the UN, redirecting debates on R2P away from military interventionism towards improved 
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reports on R2P since 2009, and the 2014 “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes”, that emphasise state institutional 
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the relationship between internal security and the UN agenda on atrocity prevention to evaluate the viability of pro-
moting atrocity prevention as currently conceived by the Office of the UNSG in high-risk contexts. It argues that an 
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1. Introduction 
The Offices of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), and 
the Special Advisors to the UNSG on the Prevention of 
Genocide, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), have 
displayed remarkably creative work in recent years in 
moving forward the international agenda on mass 
atrocity prevention through the promotion of the R2P 
principle. Since 2009, UNSG Ban Ki-moon has released 
annual reports on R2P and hosted an annual interac-
tive dialogue among member states to foster dialogue 
and shared understanding of R2P as a norm to respond 
to mass atrocity crimes both in external states, and in-
ternally. This work facilitates, to a large extent, a con-
ceptual reorientation of R2P away from its image as a 
justification for big powers to intervene in weak states 
for which it has so long been criticised (Cunliffe, 2010; 
Hehir, 2013). Rather the UNSG has sought to emphasise 
the preventative aspects of R2P, and to place particular 
onus on states to improve their domestic responses to 
threats of atrocity crimes.1 Given the clear efforts within 
the UN to redirect the language and trajectory of R2P 
discussions in recent years, this article seeks to do a 
number of things. In the first section, the article assesses 
R2P as an atrocity prevention framework to regulate 
state actors in responding to risk of atrocity crimes with-
in their own sovereign jurisdiction. It is argued that the 
UNSG’s efforts to frame R2P as a “preventive doctrine” 
                                                          
1 The definition of “atrocity crime” in this article are the four 
crimes addressed by R2P including genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
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(Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2014) is 
a significant move given the high level of international 
support for the preventative pillars. However, the focus 
of the UNSG’s annual reports on R2P remains primarily 
on macro-structural reform at the state-level, conceptu-
alising prevention as a type of intervention, and over-
emphasising the causal relation between macro-
structural reforms with atrocity prevention.  
In the second section, the article illustrates the 
shortcomings of the current UNSG’s approach through 
a case study of Pakistan. This section examines the dy-
namics of political violence within Pakistan where 
atrocities have occurred to reflect on the salience of 
the UNSG’s agenda to prevent atrocity crimes given its 
specific internal security challenges. This section argues 
that atrocity crimes inside Pakistan need to be consid-
ered in the broader social context of strategic reper-
toires developed through decades of conflict, both ex-
ternal and internal drivers of violence, and the 
robustness of civilian protection mechanisms within 
these states. The article investigates the logic of Pillar 
One in line with these contextual factors to make a 
more forceful argument for the reconceptualization of 
Pillar One that corresponds to the strategic realities of 
states facing high level risk of atrocity crimes.2  
In response to this case study, the third section in-
troduces a “social contexts of violence” approach that 
reconceptualises atrocity crimes through a relational 
framework (Gerlach, 2006, 2010; Karstedt, 2013). This 
approach accounts for the historical contextualisation 
of internal conflicts, and emphasises the interaction 
between the micro and macro dynamics of political vio-
lence that is salient for explaining mass violence in the 
context of case studies such as Pakistan. Finally, the 
chapter revisits the question of regulation of internal 
security, by arguing that a responsive regulation ap-
proach (Braithwaite, 2002) is a helpful model for think-
ing about prevention in a relational context as de-
scribed by Gerlach and Karstedt. Responsive regulation 
is both philosophically and practically consistent with 
R2P, and serves as a corrective to the externally-driven 
agenda for atrocity prevention within existing UN 
frameworks. A responsive regulation approach adds 
value to the current framework as it places more em-
phasis on local peacebuilding resources, is attuned to 
relational contexts of violence, and promotes a philos-
ophy of restorative justice that is found to be much 
more culturally salient and preferable to coercive ex-
ternal intervention in societies facing violent conflict 
and the risk of atrocity crimes. 
2. Conceptual Constraints on Pillar One 
Prevention has always been an integral aspect of the 
                                                          
2 For an analysis of Pillar One in relation to states facing a lower 
level of risk of atrocity crimes, see Jacob (2015) 
R2P doctrine since its inception in the 2001 Interna-
tional Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty (ICISS) report on R2P. Paragraph 138 of the 2005 
UN World Summit Outcome Document, unanimously 
endorsed by over 150 heads of state at the Summit, af-
firms the state’s responsibility to prevent and protect 
its population from the four atrocity crimes of geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity, now referred to as “Pillar One” responsibili-
ties of the state (UN, 2009). Moving forward from prin-
ciple to practice however has been a concern of R2P 
advocates (Bellamy, 2011; Evans, 2008; Thakur, 2011; 
UNGA, 2009). Whereas states unanimously endorsed 
the principle of state’s primary responsibility for atroci-
ty prevention at the World Summit in 2005, efforts by 
the UN to put flesh on the bones of this commitment 
only started four years later, and has gained its most 
significant traction through the UNSG’s annual reports 
on R2P in 2013 and 2014 on Pillars One (state sover-
eign responsibility) and Two (international assistance) 
respectively. 
The decision by the UNSG to provide deeper clarifi-
cation of R2P in operational terms for prevention is an 
indication that R2P is increasingly being accepted at 
the international level to serve a regulatory function in 
global governance, even though its legal status remains 
imprecise (Rosenberg, 2009; Stahn, 2007; Strauss, 
2009; Welsh & Banda, 2010). The most sophisticated 
policy and operational guidelines for atrocity preven-
tion still focus on defining multilateral and national 
toolkits and responses to external crises in other parts 
of the world however (Albright & Williamson, 2013; 
Giffen, 2010; Meyer et al., 2013; Sharma & Welsh, 
2012; UN, 2014; Waxman, 2009), with the specification 
of Pillar One duties for states own domestic institu-
tional, legal and political reforms still largely indicative. 
The UNSG’s 2013 Report Responsibility to protect: 
State responsibility and prevention does emphasise a 
wide range of domestic sites for intervention and re-
form to build state resilience to atrocity crimes. Specif-
ically the report points to risk factors such as underly-
ing patterns of discrimination and lack of accountability 
for past atrocity crimes as crucial areas for domestic 
prevention interventions. Sources of state resilience to 
atrocity crimes are cited in the UNSG’s 2013 Annual 
Report on R2P, namely constitutional protections (par-
agraph 35), democratic electoral process (paragraph 
37), the criminalisation of genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity (paragraph 40), national ac-
countability mechanisms (paragraph 41), transitional 
justice processes for past atrocity crimes (paragraph 
42), security sector reform (paragraph 43), poverty re-
duction and economic equality (paragraph 45). Further 
the report identifies a national infrastructure for the 
promotion and protection of human rights, the rule of 
law and strong governance, and the mainstreaming of 
atrocity prevention within national administrations as 
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crucial institutional sites for atrocity prevention that 
build on the need for structural resilience.  
The reorientation of the R2P discourse away from 
external interventionism is clearly a significant 
achievement. The 2014 UNSG report on R2P “Fulfilling 
our collective responsibility: international assistance 
and the responsibility to protect” builds on this reori-
entation by calling on states to reinforce the Pillar One 
capacity of states. However, the expectations on states 
for nation-wide capacity building, structural reform and 
institutional change are resource intensive, and geared 
heavily towards a governance, rule of law, and capacity 
building agenda at the macro-level that to a large ex-
tent sidelines a state’s own experiences and internal 
dynamics of political violence. This focus is clearly ar-
ticulated in the 2014 UNSG report on R2P:  
Preventive action at this stage (of general risk) re-
quires more structurally focused strategies de-
signed to help to build national resilience. The prin-
ciple objective is the creation of State structures 
and institutions that are functioning and legitimate, 
respect human rights, and the rule of law, deliver 
services equitably, and can address or defuse 
sources of tension before they escalate. (A/68/947-
S/2014/449, p. 4, paragraph 8) 
The 2014 Atrocity Prevention Framework released by 
the Office of the Special Representative to the UNSG 
on the Prevention of Genocide argues that atrocities 
are “processes”, yet makes a similar case that investing 
in the rule of law, legitimate and accountable national 
institutions, corruption, management of diversity and 
support for civil society and an open media have a di-
rect causal relationship with the prevention of atrocity 
crimes, arguing: “[f]ailure by the State to provide such 
protection and guarantees to its population can create 
an environment conducive to atrocity crimes.” (UN, 
2014, p. 3). Accordingly it sets out a series of 14 risk 
factors that analysts can use to identify potential atroc-
ity crimes. 
While each of these areas of reform are crucial, and 
by no means contested in this article, the purpose of 
this assessment is to unpack some of the assumptions 
underlying the atrocity prevention framework that is 
used to define the contents and responsibilities of Pil-
lar One for states. This agenda, I argue, is too narrow a 
vision for defining Pillar One per se, and pre-empts the 
potential significance of Pillar One as a much more 
ubiquitous and significant reorientation in thinking 
about states sovereign responsibility. States and key 
civil society actors should pay heed to the specific poli-
cy and legal recommendations embodied in existing 
atrocity prevention frameworks, however more work is 
still required in the R2P literature to conceptualise Pil-
lar One responsibilities in the context of states’ com-
plex internal security settings . 
The following section turns to the case of Pakistan, 
a state that experiences periodic attacks on civilians, to 
consider an example of the type of context in which 
atrocity prevention efforts need to be conceptualised. 
State security practices in this state are historically con-
tingent, and not just symptoms of poor governance or 
the need for security sector reform in terms of capacity 
and organisation. The next section argues that for Pillar 
One prevention duties to be fully realised, there needs 
to be a much broader project of historical reinterpreta-
tion of internal conflicts and significant long-term re-
form in security practices that have developed over 
decades of militarisation. Pillar One duties of states are 
further complicated by international dynamics—such 
as the US presence in Afghanistan and air-strikes on 
the Taliban in Pakistan. Acknowledging social, political 
and historical contingency surrounding recent atrocity 
crimes in this state challenges the dominant concep-
tion of the range of responsibilities and contexts in 
which Pillar One duties of states correspond to. It pro-
vides the basis for an argument that is geared towards 
responsive regulation based on principles of restorative 
justice. This approach, it will be argued, is preferable to 
linear models of prevention that are conducive to 
ratcheting up punitive responses and violent escalation 
than seeking to find alternative, non-escalatory path-
ways when violence is imminent. 
3. Pakistan: Conflict Trajectories and State 
Interpretation Pillar One Duties  
On 16 December 2014, 141 people—including 134 
children—were killed in an attack by the Pakistani Tali-
ban on a military school in Peshawar. The attack was 
retribution for the government’s anti-insurgency cam-
paign in North Waziristan and the Khyber area. This is 
just one of the many atrocities committed by the Taliban 
against civilians and government targets in just over a 
decade, and takes place in the context of a broader na-
tional upsurge in multiple insurgent fronts, and anti-
sectarian violence targeting Shi’a, Christian, Ahmadi and 
Hindu minorities (USCRIF, 2013, pp. 177-183).  
Tracing these events back slightly further, we note 
that Western airstrikes in the early years of the 2001 
war in Afghanistan exacerbated the divide been the 
Uzbek and Tajik populations of the north and the ag-
grieved Pashtun’s in the South that caused many Pash-
tun Taliban fighters across the border into Pakistan’s 
North West Frontier Province. The entrenchment of 
the Taliban movement in Pakistan has been effective in 
gradually galvanising a number of Sunni insurgents al-
ready operating in Pakistan (Kanwal, 2013), particularly 
a younger generation drawn more to an international-
ised brand of Islamic militancy over fragmented tribal 
separatist ideologies. Indeed the Taliban tends to draw 
the sympathy of junior ranks of the army and the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) (Johnson, 2011, pp. 167-168), 
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and many Pashtun soldiers have deserted the army, 
not wanting to fight fellow Muslims (Kanwal, 2013, p. 
2). These trends have significantly affected the morale 
of the Pakistani security forces in conducting their 
counter-insurgency operations.  
In Afghanistan, the Taliban has grown from an es-
timated 2,000 fighters in 2002 to over 60,000 today 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2015), with thousands of 
Taliban fighters spilling over the borders into Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s decades-long military strategy of fostering 
insurgency in Afghanistan to buffer its own national se-
curity by achieving “strategic depth” has caused a se-
vere blow-back with the creation of the Pakistani Tali-
ban since the U.S.-led invasion in Afghanistan. The 
Pakistani Taliban movement is seeking a revolution 
against the “apostate” Pakistani government due to its 
support for the Western-led invasion into Afghanistan. 
Following decades of fostering insurgency in Afghani-
stan, the Pakistani military has in recent years turned 
its focus towards countering insurgency on its own ter-
ritory (Mullick, 2009).  
As the 2014 school attack illustrates vividly, the in-
terventionist pathways taken both by Western powers 
and Pakistan in Afghanistan since 2001, and the coun-
ter-insurgency strategies taken by the Pakistani securi-
ty forces have to date lead to the escalation of violence 
in which thousands of Pakistani civilians have become 
direct targets, including bombings on civilians sites 
such as places of worship by militant groups, and wide-
spread fatalities and displacement caused by the mili-
tary’s counter-insurgency operations. Between 2003 
and March 2015, an estimated 20,228 civilians and 
6,111 security personnel have been killed through ter-
rorist violence alone in Pakistan. Some 30,695 terror-
ists and insurgents have been killed during this same 
period (SATP, 2015). The Pakistani government and 
military, divided as they are, view the Pakistani Taliban 
through the lens of internal security and state cohe-
sion. Many of these internal security issues are the re-
sult of a long trajectory of policy choices favouring mili-
tary escalation to deal with Pakistan’s internal divisions 
along tribal, ethnic and religious lines since the early 
1970s (Gazdar, 2006; Khan, 2012), particularly after the 
loss of East Pakistan in 1971.  
Given this brief historical context in which to un-
derstand the killings of 141 civilians in 2014 and similar 
attacks (e.g. Craig, 2014) where do R2P responsibilities 
of the state to prevent and protect populations fit into 
the picture? In historical perspective, Pakistan’s R2P 
obligations are very recent and are unenforced. The 
choices made in pursuing military options to internal 
crises are the consequence of a number of overarching 
factors including decades of strategic repertoires that 
resort to militarised repression of internal dissent, the 
internationalised conflict against the Taliban including 
U.S. air-strikes on Pakistan’s soil that have exacerbated 
internal divisions, and significant U.S. funding to Paki-
stan’s military that disproportionately privileges this 
sector. Furthermore, the current threat to civilian lives 
in Pakistan is periodic rather than sustained, low 
enough in numeric terms and shielded by geopolitical 
sensitivities of powerful states not to be considered a 
Pillar Three external intervention. In terms of R2P 
thinking, the expectations are that the state can and 
should be able to manage the atrocities such as the 
school bombing through their own domestic capacity. 
While this is a reasonable expectation, further thinking 
on what kind of actions constitute Pillar One responsi-
bilities need to be clarified in this context.  
The state of Pakistan has openly endorsed R2P, in-
cluding Pillar One on the prevention and protection of 
civilians from atrocity crimes. At the UN General As-
sembly informal interactive dialogue on the Responsi-
bility to Protect in 2014, the representative of Pakistan 
Ambassador Masood Khan stated:  
The basic thrust of the first two pillars is to prevent 
atrocity crimes by building societies on the basis of 
reconciliation, justice and security. R2P response 
should not be activated only after eruption of or a 
full- blown armed conflict. 
The Pakistan Ambassador qualified his support more 
explicitly by stating: “There should be no exceptional-
ism in pursuit of the goal of protection of civilians. Pal-
estine is a case in point.” 
The Ambassador summed up the Pillar One princi-
ple with powerful acknowledgement of reconciliation, 
justice and security within societies as core responsibil-
ities of states towards their own population. Indeed 
Pakistan’s experience with Muslahathi Committee’s to 
bridge traditional and state law and order systems evi-
dences their recognition of the need for restorative 
justice approaches in a number rural spaces where the 
Taliban have gained popular support (Braithwaite & 
Gohar, 2014). However, the reference to Palestine 
shifts the focus away from the internal situation in Pa-
kistan to which such statements are highly relevant. It 
also engenders a UN culture in which states are apt at 
identifying appropriate cases where R2P is relevant ra-
ther than embracing a more reflective stance on the in-
ternal security situation being faced in the home state.  
Pillar One clearly has significant implications for 
regulating the counter-insurgency and civilian protec-
tion efforts within states, but I argue here that the 
scope of Pillar One as articulated in UN and related 
documentation separates the international prevention 
agenda from these contextual settings of political vio-
lence, including historical military trajectories and re-
gional and international drivers, in which atrocities oc-
cur. This separation is consequently replicated and 
entrenched in state conceptualisations of Pillar One 
that fail to see their international obligations on R2P 
associated with their internal security objectives.  
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Therefore, in the case of Pakistan, the assumption 
underlying the principle UN documentation—that ad-
dressing a number of macro indicators related to gov-
ernance and rule of law, security sector reform and 
human rights constitutes the Pillar One responsibilities 
of states—is misplaced for two reasons. First, it is not 
founded on an empirical basis for identifying the con-
texts in which atrocities occur but rather responds to a 
generic framework of structural factors supposed to 
have a causal relation with atrocity crimes. Second, it 
assumes that the actions and responsibilities of the 
state in relation to atrocities within its domestic juris-
diction are independent and prior to international as-
sistance. It does not allow for historical and political 
complexity in which a range of domestic and interna-
tional factors are at play in setting the trajectory of po-
litical violence and atrocity crimes at the domestic lev-
el. As such it places heavy onus on the state for 
reversing lengthy historical trajectories, and vilifies the 
state when it is deemed unable or unwilling to protect 
its own populations from atrocity crimes that are mani-
festations of broader intractable internal security 
quagmires. The “failure” of states on Pillar One duties 
therefore is deemed to warrant international condem-
nation and assistance and curtails the consideration of 
alternatives prior to external intervention (military or 
non-military) in which R2P may be considered a useful 
framework for preventing atrocity crimes. 
Pakistan’s experience brings into question the sali-
ence of equating Pillar One duties with a pre-
determined atrocity prevention policy framework in 
states facing protracted insurgency, secessionism or 
terrorism that have not been considered as R2P cases 
for Pillar Three external intervention yet face a high 
level of risk of atrocity crimes being committed against 
domestic populations. It also indicates that there are 
more specific considerations that need to be fore-
grounded in this agenda that include military reper-
toires, both external and internal drivers of violence, 
and the robustness of civilian protection mechanisms 
within these states. The next section considers the 
conventional logic surrounding Pillar One to explain 
why it has been so narrowly conceptualised to date in 
the R2P literature, before moving to consider alterna-
tive and more productive ways to conceptualise this 
aspect of R2P.  
4. Reconceptualising Pillar One in Strategic Context  
In 2012, Williams, Ulbrick and Worboys argued that 
there is a step missing in Pillar Three of R2P, namely 
the lack of a capacity for international coercive inter-
vention when the UNSC fails to mandate action in the 
face of mass atrocities such as those in Syria. They out-
line criteria through which the limited use of force by 
the international community could be imagined with-
out UNSC authorisation to ensure that R2P operates as 
intended. They argue that “[a]lthough the use of force 
without Security Council authorization is a complicated 
and delicate question’ their criteria for permitting non-
UNSC authorized international military intervention is 
‘the most appropriate way to develop R2P moving for-
ward.” (Williams, Ulbrick, & Worboys, 2012, p. 476). 
If it is the case that R2P is “missing a step” in terms 
of its most punitive and coercive capacity, it is also the 
case that there is a need to unpack the assumptions 
surrounding prevention embedded in the logic of the 
R2P doctrine to create more space at the less coercive 
end of the R2P spectrum to successfully protect popu-
lations from atrocity crimes. The conventional story 
told about the prevention element of R2P in the litera-
ture is as follows:  
First, individual states [are] primarily responsible 
for protecting their populations. ICISS categorized 
this aspect of the R2P as a state’s “responsibility to 
prevent,” outlining a state’s obligation to eliminate 
the root causes of mass atrocities. (Williams et al., 
2012, p. 482) 
There are several assumptions embedded in this ac-
count that elucidates the reasons why these authors 
feel that Pillar One options are all too readily exhaust-
ed in the context of conflict scenarios, and that more 
rigorous capacity to resort to interventional military in-
terventions is necessary. The first assumption is that 
prevention can be dealt with in isolation by states as a 
first step in a three tiered process. This assumes an in-
ward-focussed state that has the capacity and will to 
counter domestic instability or conflict that is on an 
upward trajectory towards mass atrocity before it 
reaches an imminent stage. The situation in Pakistan 
requires us to take a step back to think about the mul-
tiple trajectories, and complicating factors related to 
geostrategic interest, national security calculations and 
military repertoires that unsettle this standard defini-
tion of what Pillar One means in the context of states. 
This also helps us to understand how states could con-
ceivably endorse Pillar One in international forums 
without interpreting it as relevant to these proximate 
factors. 
Pakistan’s foreign policy goal of creating strategic 
depth in Afghanistan is a significant factor in its nation-
al security calculations, previously to serve as a buffer 
from the Soviet Union and to prevent Indian encircle-
ment of its territory. This strategy has driven Pakistan’s 
involvement in fostering insurgency in Afghanistan 
since the CIA created and supported the Afghani muja-
hedeen in the 1980s. Pakistan became the state most 
affected by terrorism following the U.S.-led invasion in-
to Afghanistan and faces an intractable insurgency and 
radicalisation. Its internal security situation is therefore 
not an isolated case for which the Pakistan state is 
solely responsible—external factors such as dispropor-
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tionate U.S. funding of the Pakistani military over other 
forms of assistance has facilitated its propensity to-
wards militarised responses to domestic problems.  
Many of these problems are of course not just the 
fault of external actors such as the U.S., and the Paki-
stani military is reaping much of the destruction that it 
has sown in Afghanistan, but the point here is that 
these broader geostrategic dynamics are part of the 
Pillar One spectrum in which prevention and protection 
efforts at the state level need to be conceptualised. I 
would like to bracket here that international responsi-
bility in the context of prevention is just as much about 
not creating the conditions for quagmires in states as it 
is about external response in perceived failed states—
this is an element that is absent in discussions on Pillar 
One but one that can be seen at the heart of many of 
today’s protracted conflicts in which atrocity crimes 
are persistent features. The international community is 
not just the post-hoc solution to state failure on atroci-
ty crimes, but is constitutive of the Pillar One context in 
which states are expected to act. 
The second assumption embedded in the conven-
tional account of Pillar One is that prevention corre-
sponds to an “obligation to eliminate the root causes 
of mass atrocities”, thereby assuming an anachronistic 
perspective of the trajectory of violence and internal 
conflicts in which atrocity crimes take place. Again here 
it is assumed that the so-called “root causes” are inde-
pendent variables that can be isolated and eliminated 
through targeted state reforms. Yet this conceptualisa-
tion does not permit us to consider atrocities in terms 
of the lengthy historical trajectories through which 
they have emerged, or the relational context in which 
they are manifested. In the case of Pakistan, how might 
we “eliminate” root causes such as the process of na-
tion-building, the geographic concentration of political 
power and resourcing in the province of Punjab, the 
perpetual anxiety over national cohesion that has 
guided its counter-insurgency campaigns since the 
1970s, and its geo-strategic concern with achieving 
strategic depth in Afghanistan to mitigate India’s strat-
egy of encirclement. Without these contextual factors, 
it is impossible to explain the rise of Sunni-insurgency 
and the related surge in sectarian violence in Pakistan 
to which recent atrocities are attributed.  
Here then, what we need to be concerned about is 
not just eliminating root causes per se, but rather 
changing trajectories that have been set in motion by 
responding to strategic repertoires. In this regard, the 
Pakistani military has been effective in gradually reduc-
ing collateral damage and improving the protection of 
displaced populations through its counter-insurgency 
strategy since 2009 when collateral damage became an 
important political factor at the national level (Mullick, 
2009). Conceived this way, Pillar One should align 
much more closely with the strategic realities on the 
ground, given the rather utopian prospect of eliminat-
ing root causes before they lead to mass atrocity in 
contexts where political violence is already well en-
trenched. It also means however that Pillar One recon-
ceptualised is a much broader project, and much more 
ubiquitous than the limited and rare occasions in which 
coercive international interventions under a R2P pre-
text could be warranted.  
The next section introduces the literature on the 
social contexts of violence to challenge the empirical 
basis on which core Pillar One assumptions are found-
ed. It argues that a relational approach to understand-
ing the interaction between macro and micro-dynamics 
of violence provides a stronger basis on which to build 
a conceptualisation of Pillar One in the R2P literature 
that to date is not yet developed.  
5. Rethinking Prevention through a Social Contexts of 
Violence Approach  
In recent years there has been a growing interest in in-
ternational relations and political science that is con-
cerned with the micro-dynamics of violence at the local 
level (Auteserre, 2010; Kalyvas, 2006; Lemarchand, 
2009) for explaining the large-scale armed conflicts and 
genocides that shape regional and international securi-
ty. Simplified explanations or macro-narratives of con-
flicts such as those centred on ethnic rivalry in Rwanda 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo circumvent in-
ternational understandings of the complex micro-
sociological causes and dynamics of mass violence 
(Straus, 2008) that are often counter-intuitive to the 
macro-narrative, and cause expansive international 
peacekeeping efforts to repeatedly fail (Auteserre, 
2010; Kemp et al., 2013). 
The development of this important body of litera-
ture has significant implications for thinking about 
atrocity prevention. Scholars such as Susanne Karstedt 
(2013) argue that while genocides are rare, atrocities 
are much more common, and today tend to feature as 
events that “are of a smaller scale and reiterated” as 
opposed to mass genocides. Mass atrocities are con-
ceptualised as part of broader trajectories of violence, 
embedded within historical contexts of social conflict, 
and therefore highly responsive to dynamic deterrence 
during the path of escalation to alter these trajectories 
(Braithwaite, 2014; Karstedt, 2013, p. 385; Klusemann, 
2012, pp. 473-475).  
Christian Gerlach, in developing a relational ap-
proach to the study of “extremely violence societies”, 
(2006, 2010) argues that conventional studies of signif-
icant twentieth-century genocides have presented a 
narrow account of the dynamics of mass atrocities that 
have confined our understanding of such events. First-
ly, conventional assumptions contained within studies 
of genocide focus on ethnicity/race or other singular 
elements of intent as a cause for systematic, one-sided 
violence. Where they do acknowledge multi-causality, 
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they still seek to single out a dominant explanatory fac-
tor. Secondly, conventional studies seek to explain 
genocide in terms of a neat categorical distinction that 
is separate from other forms of social violence, rather 
than seeking to identify the linkages between them. 
And finally, such studies emphasise the role of the 
state (genocide as a state crime) rather than on broad 
and multiple levels of social interactions where wide-
spread mobilisation of populations is vital for explain-
ing how violence can take place on a mass scale. 
One of Gerlach’s critiques of contemporary geno-
cide studies is that it is heavily biased towards the state 
and structural mechanisms to prevent such violence 
that “work towards simplification and against contex-
tualisation.” (2006, p. 465). This assumption has to a 
large extent carried through to most atrocity preven-
tion frameworks that place primary emphasis on gov-
ernance, rule of law, and security sector reforms at the 
macro-level. While the UN’s current approach to atroc-
ity prevention has been broadly influenced by the 
fields of criminology, peace and conflict studies and 
public health (Sharma & Welsh, 2012), a sociological 
perspective contributes a complex picture of atrocity 
crimes (eg. Bakonyi & De Guevara, 2009; Kalyvas, 2006) 
that point towards the need for a dynamic and contex-
tualised model of atrocity prevention for violence at 
the sub-national level.  
Following on from these conclusions, Karstedt 
(2013) has argued that there is a move within genocide 
studies towards conceptualisations of atrocity crimes 
that have more legal and analytical relevance to the 
nature of contemporary political violence. The UN ap-
proach to atrocity prevention not only tends to focus 
on the macro level of state institutions and structures, 
but the prevention models that inform its approach as-
sume a linear path of crisis escalation from risk through 
to imminence (Evans, 2008, p. 87; Sharma & Welsh, 
2012). History shows however that micro-level violence 
below the state and systemic/regional violence peak 
and decline in non-linear trajectories, and conflict tra-
jectories are shaped by the interaction between these 
micro-social processes with the macro-structures. 
(Berenschot, 2011; Braithwaite & D’Costa, 2012; 
Kalyvas, 2003, 2006; Karstedt, 2013, p. 386; Sanín & 
Wood, 2014; Tilly, 2003; Weinstein, 2007). A relational 
approach to the study of mass atrocity crimes there-
fore does not assume a Galtung-model of structural 
and cultural violence that makes societies prone to 
atrocities, but rather traces the events and trajectories 
that led to a specific event of genocide.  
Another key limitation of models of structural pre-
ventions is that they assume a direct causal relation-
ship between “root causes” and violence without con-
textualising the dynamics through which these root 
causes will develop into various forms of violence. It re-
lies on “external diagnosis and prognosis” of risk that 
bypasses sources of domestic and local resilience 
(McLoughlin, 2014, p. 410). In doing so, such models 
also de-emphasise the benefits of alternative ap-
proaches to prevention through empowering local 
agency and resilience of populations where history has 
proven that local strategies of escape and survival have 
prevented the greatest numbers of deaths from mass 
atrocity crimes (Mayerson, 2014). Indeed a number of 
scholars have begun to focus on agency where self-
protection strategies are demonstrated to be crucial 
for survival well before international assistance is 
forthcoming (Baines & Paddon, 2012; Kaplan, 2013; 
Mégret, 2009) 
The implications of a relational approach to mass 
atrocities for assessing the current UN atrocity preven-
tion strategy is to question the general “nature” of a 
state as prone to such crimes based on an assumed 
causal relationship between given state structures with 
the likelihood of atrocity crimes. A relational under-
standing of mass-atrocity crimes is to some extent 
counter-intuitive to the central thrust of the UN’s cur-
rent approach to mass-atrocity prevention, as it argues 
for the need to recognise that both resistors and par-
ticipants of violence are found in the same society, that 
violence ebbs and flows with peaks, and that broad so-
cial participation (alliances/coalitions) are needed for 
such extensive violence to take place. It is not ques-
tioned here that core governance and rule of law insti-
tutions such as the judiciary and security sector are 
crucial for successful prevention of atrocity crimes. 
What is argued here is that this emphasis on structural 
reform at the state level alone is inadequate without 
taking into account the micro-sociological dimensions 
of atrocity crimes at the sub-national level, and how 
those dynamics then interact with the macro and sys-
temic levels. As the case-study on Pakistan illustrates, 
each of these levels are interconnected and shape the 
unique trajectories of conflict and mass violence in dif-
ferent ways. There is a need for a responsive approach 
to these social contexts of violence than is envisaged in 
multilateral atrocity prevention toolkits, as these place 
a heavy emphasis on escalation towards more coercive 
interventions. 
6. Responsive Regulation: An Alternative Framework 
for Considering the Regulation of Atrocity Prevention 
The purpose of this article has been to assess the UN’s 
agenda on mass atrocity prevention, noting in the in-
troduction that UN efforts to clarify R2P implementa-
tion frameworks point to an increasing regulatory role 
that R2P is occupying at the international level. In par-
ticular, recent reports published by the UNSG provide 
the basis for a legal and policy framework to guide 
state responses to atrocity crimes. These reports in-
clude recommendations for enhanced accountability of 
states on R2P duties to the international community 
through processes such as the Universal Periodic Re-
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view in the UN Human Rights Council (UN, 2014). In 
this concluding section of the article, I briefly consider 
responsive regulation as an alternative regulatory 
model for R2P that complements these existing rec-
ommendations, yet accounts for a more dynamic and 
contextualised understanding that responds to both 
the micro and macro processes of atrocity crimes.  
Responsive regulation is a dynamic framework in 
criminology that is based on the belief that because so-
cial conflict is relational, regulation will be more effec-
tive if it is responsive to the social contexts it seeks to 
regulate (Braithwaite, 2014). It promotes a philosophy 
that restorative justice is preferable to retributive jus-
tice, arguing that restorative models of justice are cul-
turally salient for the prevention of crime in most parts 
of the world; and that the resort to coercive escala-
tions is mitigated by inclusive dialogue that draws on 
local conflict resolution resources (Braithwaite, 2002). 
Responsive regulation seeks to avoid orthodoxy and ri-
gidity in regulatory frameworks which to date has been 
a stumbling block for atrocity prevention efforts by ex-
ternal actors such as the European Union (Meyer et al., 
2013) in responding to unique and contingent internal 
security environments. 
A responsive regulation pyramid has at its widest 
base options for dialogue and reconciliation to build 
peace within communities and deter criminal acts. The 
pyramid allows for the capacity to resort to more coer-
cive forms of enforcement as one moves up the pyra-
mid, where punitive action would be warranted in the 
most extreme cases of criminal violation. What differ-
entiates a responsive regulatory approach to criminal 
deterrence from traditional approaches is that it is 
concerned with pushing prevention strategies “down” 
the pyramid towards dialogic and restorative methods. 
Rather than moving up the pyramid to more coercive 
options when a restorative approach fails, responsive 
regulation seeks to widen the base by exploring alter-
native options that draw on local peacebuilding re-
sources.  
R2P reflects the pyramid to a large degree in that 
prevention at the base of the pyramid (Pillar One) is 
considered the preferred option, before escalating up 
towards coercive intervention at the peak of the pyra-
mid (Pillar Three).3 Yet current conceptualisations of 
R2P look rather like an upside-down pyramid whereby 
the broadest focus in the scholarly literature has tend-
ed to emphasise the most punitive and coercive end of 
the spectrum for assessing its conceptual validity and 
success. For this reason, I am arguing that R2P could be 
a much more effective regulatory framework in rela-
tion to the internal security concerns of states if states 
had much more accountability and incentive to push 
down the pyramid towards responsive, restorative ap-
                                                          
3 For a model of R2P crisis escalation and response see Sharma 
and Welsh (2012) 
proaches towards atrocity prevention. This includes 
expanding the creative options available in the articula-
tion of Pillar One than currently exists in international 
atrocity prevention frameworks.  
One clear example of the saliency of this approach 
to dealing with the prevention of atrocity crimes is 
found in the work by John Braithwaite and Ali Wardak 
on the rule of law in rural Afghanistan (2013a, b). 
These authors argue that the rise of the Taliban, and 
the ensuing atrocities that occur under their authority, 
was enabled by a lack of order and legitimate authority 
in rural Afghanistan. The fragmentation of the Afghan 
state following the Soviet invasion, and the subsequent 
rise of externally-backed armed Mujahedeen groups 
created competition for authority in rural areas where 
a power vacuum exists. US-led intervention into Af-
ghanistan in 2001 pursued a “Hobbesian” solution by 
backing a leviathan government under Hamid Karzai, 
and supporting a strong, centralised state that failed to 
bring order or a legitimate rule of law in these rural 
spaces (Braithwaite & Wardak, 2013a). These condi-
tions have enabled the Taliban to flourish, and so 
Braithwaite and Wardak offer a “Jeffersonian alterna-
tive” (Braithwaite & Wardak, 2013b) to state-building, 
arguing that macro-level state building efforts need to 
work in support of local justice systems, such as the 
jirga/shura courts to offer a legitimate alternative to 
rule of law provision in rural spaces that could draw 
away popular support from the Taliban.  
Pakistan’s limited experience of creating hybrid 
formal and traditional justice mechanisms through 
Muslahathi Committees (Braithwaite & Gohar, 2014) 
likewise demonstrate that employing restorative jus-
tice approaches within a rule of law framework limit 
local violence, increase the accountability of police to 
civil society, and play a role in preventing armed con-
flict. These context-specific responses support the rule 
of law and transitional justice as promoted in the 
UNSG’s 2013 and 2014 reports, yet they conceptualise 
regulation in more dynamic, contextualised and locally-
salient framework.  
A recent survey conducted among the local popula-
tion in Syria found that despite overwhelming decline 
in a desire for an internationally brokered peace set-
tlement to end the conflict, there was widespread sup-
port for locally brokered ceasefires between warring 
communities—a strategy that some consider to be the 
most feasible option to scaling down the violence, the 
director of the study notes: 
[T]here was also a surprising degree of interest in 
traditional ceremonies of reconciliation at the local 
level, sulha and musalaha, ceremonies which in-
volve apology, compensation, and the re-
establishment of relations among neighbours. If the 
national conflict can be worked out there may be 
ways for people to use these kinds of local and tra-
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ditional ceremonies to coexists, if not live in har-
mony. (Hoge, 2015) 
These local traditional justice mechanisms discussed in 
these examples illustrate ways that responsive regula-
tion can be conceptualised to promote justice and pre-
vent atrocity crimes in societies facing high levels of 
risk of atrocity crimes. By emphasising social, political 
and historical contingency, this approach is well aligned 
with research on the micro-dynamics of political vio-
lence that is linked to mass atrocity crimes discussed 
previously in this article, and therefore offers an im-
portant resource for considering how international 
regulation of internal security to prevent atrocities may 
be conceivable.  
This article concludes therefore by suggesting that a 
constructive research agenda should be built on a fuller 
consideration of the restorative elements for national 
peacebuilding and atrocity prevention that gives great-
er attention to the Pillar One duties of states. Pillar 
One, it has been argued here, is much more ubiquitous 
than is currently recognised given the narrow concep-
tualisation of Pillar One as synonymous with preven-
tion frameworks. A broader conceptualisation of Pillar 
One should consider these prevention frameworks as 
useful tools among other options in the larger effort to 
locate and redirect the historical trajectories of conflict 
and deeply entrenched repertoires of state security ac-
tors to promote sovereign responsibility towards do-
mestic populations.  
Acknowledgments 
The author would like to thank John Braithwaite, Su-
sanne Karstedt and Stephen McLoughlin for helpful 
discussions, as well as well as three anonymous re-
viewers for their comments, that greatly improved this 
article. All shortcomings are the author’s own.  
Conflict of Interests 
The author declares no conflict of interests. 
References 
Albright, M. K., & Williamson, R. S. (2013). The United 
States and R2P: From words to action. Washington: 
Brookings, United States Holocaust Memorial Mu-
seum and United States Institute of Peace.  
Auteserre, S. (2010). The trouble with the Congo: Local 
violence and the failure of international peacebuild-
ing. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Baines, E., & Paddon, E. (2012). “This is how we sur-
vived”: Civilian agency and humanitarian protec-
tion. Security Dialogue, 43(3), 231-247. 
doi:10.1177/0967010612444150 
Bakonyi, J., & De Guevara, B. B. (2009). The mosaic of 
violence—An introduction. Civil Wars, 11(4), 397-
413. doi: 10.1080/13698240903411298 
Bellamy, A. J. (2011). Global politics and the responsibil-
ity to protect: From words to deeds. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Berenschot, W. (2011). Riot politics: Hindu-Muslim vio-
lence and the Indian state. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative justice and respon-
sive regulation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Braithwaite, J. (2014). Limits on violence; limits on re-
sponsive regulatory theory. Law & Policy, 36(4), 
432-456. 
Braithwaite, J., & D’Costa, B. (2012). Cascades of vio-
lence in Bangladesh, peacebuilding compared work-
ing paper. Canberra: RegNet, The Australian Na-
tional University. 
Braithwaite, J., & Gohar, A. (2014). Restorative justice, 
policing and insurgency: Learning from Pakistan. 
Law and Society Review, 48(3), 531-561. doi: 
10.1111/lasr.12091 
Braithwaite, J., & Wardak, A. (2013a). Crime and war in 
Afghanistan: Part I: The Hobbesian solution. British 
Journal of Criminology, 53, 179-196. 
Braithwaite, J. & Wardak, A. (2013b). Crime and war in 
Afghanistan: Part II: A Jeffersonian alternative? Brit-
ish Journal of Criminology, 53, 197-214. 
Council on Foreign Relations. (2015). The Taliban. Re-
trieved from http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-
organizations-and- networks/taliban/p35985?cid= 
marketing_use-taliban_infoguide-012115#!/  
Craig, T. (2014, January 15). Sectarian killings soar in 
Pakistan, raising fears of regional spillover. Wash-
ington Post. 
Cunliffe, P. (2010). Dangerous duties: Power, paternal-
ism and the “responsibility to protect”. 
Review of International Studies, 36, 79-96. doi: 
10.1017/S0260210511000076  
Evans, G. (2008). The responsibility to protect: Ending 
mass atrocities once and for all. Washington: The 
Brookings Institute.  
Gazdar, H. (2006). Counter-insurgencies in Pakistan. 
Economic and Political Weekly, 41(20), 1952-1953. 
doi:150.203.230.231 
Gerlach, C. (2006). Extremely violent societies: An al-
ternative to the concept of genocide. Journal of 
Genocide Research, 8(4), 455-471. doi:10.1080/ 
14623520601056299 
Gerlach, C. (2010). Extremely violence societies: Mass 
violence in the twentieth-century world. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Giffen, A. (2010). Addressing the doctrinal deficit de-
veloping guidance to prevent and respond to wide-
spread or systematic attacks against civilians. 
Washington: Stimson Center. 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2014). 
Summary of the sixth informal interactive dialogue 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 16-26 25 
of the UN General Assembly on the responsibility to 
protect. New York: Ralph Bunche Institute for In-
ternational Studies. 
Hehir, A. (2013). The permanence of inconsistency: 
Libya, the Security Council, and the responsibility to 
protect. International Security, 38(1), 137-159. 
doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00125 
Hoge, W. (2015, April 3). Hearts have hardened, but 
Syrians still believe in reconciliation: Q&A with Craig 
Charney. IPI Global Observatory. Retrieved from 
http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/04/syria-isis-
assad-united-nations/  
International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty. (2001). The responsibility to protect. 
Ottawa: International Development Research Cen-
tre. 
Jacob, C. (2015). State responsibility and prevention in 
the responsibility to protect: Communal violence in 
India. Global Responsibility to Protect, 7(1), 56-80. 
Johnson, R. (2011). Jihad and the ‘‘war on terror’’: In-
telligence, ethics, and justice in Pakistan and Af-
ghanistan. In M. Phythian & A. Bergman (Eds.), In-
telligence ethics and the war on terror (pp. 166-
186). Oxon: Routledge. 
Kalyvas, S. N. (2003). The ontology of “political vio-
lence”: Action and identity in civil wars. Perspec-
tives on Politics, 1(3), 475-494. 
Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). The logic of violence in civil war. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Kanwal, G. (2013). Pakistan’s internal security chal-
lenges: Will the military cope? (Issue Brief No. 230). 
New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. 
Kaplan, O. (2013). Protecting civilians in civil war: The 
institution of the ATCC in Colombia. Journal of 
Peace Research, 50(3), 351-367. doi:10.1177/ 
0022343313477884 
Karstedt, S. (2013). Contextualizing mass atrocity 
crimes: Moving toward a relational approach. An-
nual Review of Law and Social Science, 9, 383-404. 
doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102612-134016 
Kemp, W., Shaw, M., & Boutellis, A. (2013). The ele-
phant in the room: How can peace operations deal 
with organized crime? New York: International 
Peace Institute.  
Khan, H. (2012). Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy 
and protracted insurgency in Pakistan’s Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Tigah: A Journal 
of Peace and Development, 2, 102-103. FATA Re-
search Centre, Islamabad. 
Klusemann, S. (2012). Massacres as process: A micro-
sociological theory of internal patterns of mass 
atrocities. European Journal of Criminology, 9(5), 
468-480.  
Lemarchand, R. (2009). The dynamics of violence in 
central Africa. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University 
Press. 
Mayersen, D. (2014). Rethinking approaches to preven-
tion under the responsibility to protect. Global Re-
sponsibility to Protect, 6(4), 483-507. doi:10.1163/ 
1875984X-00604007 
McLoughlin, S. (2014). Rethinking the structural pre-
vention of mass atrocities. Global Responsibility to 
Protect, 6(4), 407-429. doi:10.1163/1875984X-
00604004 
Mégret, F. (2009). Beyond the “salvation” paradigm: 
Responsibility to protect (others) vs the power of 
protecting oneself. Security Dialogue, 40(6), 575-95. 
doi:10.1177/0967010609350632 
Meyer, C., Smith, K. E., De Franco, C., Peral, L., & 
Strauss, E. (2013). The EU and the prevention of 
mass atrocities: An assessment of strengths and 
weaknesses. Budapest: Budapest Centre for the In-
ternational Prevention of Genocide and Mass 
Atrocities. 
Mullick, H. A. (2009). Pakistan’s security paradox: 
Countering and fomenting insurgencies. Hurlburt 
Field: Joint Special Operations University. 
Rosenberg, S. P. (2009). Responsibility to protect: A 
framework for prevention. Global Responsibility to 
Protect, 1, 442-477. doi:10.1163/187598509X1250 
5800144837 
Sanín, F. G., & Wood, E. (2014). Ideology in civil war: 
Instrumental adoption and beyond. Journal of 
Peace Research, 51(2), 213-226. doi:10.1177/ 
0022343313514073 
Sharma, S., & Welsh, J. (2012). Operationalizing the re-
sponsibility to prevent (Policy Brief, Oxford Institute 
for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict). Oxford: Univer-
sity of Oxford. 
South Asia Terrorism Portal. (2015). Fatalities in terror-
ist violence in Pakistan 2003-2015, SATP. Retrieved 
from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/ 
pakistan/database/casualties.htm#  
Stahn, C. (2007). Responsibility to protect: Political 
rhetoric or emerging legal norm? The American 
Journal of International Law, 101(1), 99-120. 
Straus, S. (2008). The order of genocide: Race, power, 
and war in Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Strauss, E. (2009). A bird in the hand is worth two in 
the bush—On the assumed legal nature of the re-
sponsibility to protect. Global Responsibility to Pro-
tect, 1, 291-323. doi:10.1163/187598409X450758  
Thakur, R. (2011). The responsibility to protect: Norms, 
laws and the use of force in international politics. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Tilly, C. (2003). The politics of collective violence. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.  
United Nations. (2005). World summit outcome (GA 
Res. 60/1). New York: United Nations. 
United Nations. (2009). Implementing the responsibility 
to protect: Report of the Secretary General 
(A/63/677). New York: United Nations. 
United Nations. (2013). Responsibility to protect: State 
responsibility and prevention (A/67/929-
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 16-26 26 
S/2013/399). New York: United Nations. 
United Nations. (2014). Fulfilling our collective respon-
sibility: International assistance and the responsibil-
ity to protect. (A/68/947–S/2014/449). New York: 
United Nations. 
United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom. (2013). USCRIF 2013 annual report. 
Washington: USCRIF. 
Waxman, C. (2009). Intervention to stop genocide and 
mass atrocities (Council Special Report No49). New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. 
Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Inside rebellion: The politics of 
insurgent violence. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Welsh, J. M., & Banda, M. (2010). International law and 
the responsibility to protect: Clarifying or expanding 
states’ responsibilities? Global Responsibility to Pro-
tect, 2, 213-231. doi:10.1163/187598410X500363 
Williams, P. R., Ulbrick, T. J., & Worboys, J. (2012). Pre-
venting mass atrocity crimes: The responsibility to 
protect and the Syria crisis. Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law, 1(45), 473-503. 
About the Author 
 
Dr. Cecilia Jacob 
Cecilia Jacob is Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations, College of Asia and the 
Pacific, The Australian National University. She specializes in security studies, civilian protection and 
the Responsibility to Protect, with a focus on South and Southeast Asia. She is the author of Child Se-
curity in Asia: the impact of armed conflict in Cambodia and Myanmar (2014). 
 
